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I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
In times when the citizenry is specially exhorted to live within
the law and to seek what they desire within the law, it seems
particularly appropriate to insure to citizens of the United States
the right to express themselves by use of the ballot.'
Several courts have recently been presented with the question of
whether one year residency requirements for voting violate the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.' Not only have these
courts not reached the same conclusions, but they have also had
differences of opinion with regard to what test should be used in
determining the constitutionality of the residency statutes involved,
As early as 1904, the United States Supreme Court, in the case of
Pope v. Williams,3 was faced with deciding the constitutionality of a
state statute which required a person coming into the state to reside to
make a declaration of residential intent at least a year before he could
be registered as a voter of the state. In holding that the statute did not
violate the United States Constitution, the Court, discussing the
privilege to vote, said:
It may not be refused on account of race, color, or previous
condition of servitude, but it does not follow from mere citizenship
of the United States. In other words, the privilege to vote in a state
is within the jurisdiction of the state itself, to be exercised as the
state may direct, and upon such terms as it may seem proper,
provided, of course, no discrimination is made between
individuals, in violation of the Federal Constitution.'
The Court went on to state that it could neither find that the statute
denied the plaintiff the equal protection of the laws, nor that it was
1. Keane v. Mihaly, I I Cal. App. 3d 1037, 90 Cal. Rptr. 263, 268 (Ct. App. 1970).
2. Cocanower v. Marston, 318 F. Supp. 402 (D. Ariz. 1970); Burg v. Canniffe, 315
F. Supp. 380 (D. Mass. 1970); Blumstein v. Ellington, (M.D. Tenn. 1970) petition for
cert. filed, 39 U.S.L.W. 3229 (U.S. Sept. 29, 1970) (No. 769), prob. jurisdiction noted,
39 U.S.L.W. 3375 (U.S. Mar. 1, 1971) (No. 769); Keane v. Mihaly, II Cal. App. 3d
1037, 90 Cal. Rptr. 263 (Ct. App. 1970); Kohn v. Davis, 39 U.S.L.W. 2253 (D. Vt.
1970); Bufford v. Holton, 319 F. Supp. 843 (E.D. Va. 1970).
3. 193 U.S. 621 (1904).
4. Id. at 632.
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"repugnant to any fundamental or inalienable rights of citizens of the
United States . .. "s
In 1959, the Supreme Court, in the case of Lassiter v.
Northampton County Board of Elections,6 again spoke approvingly of
residency requirements for voters. After upholding the constitutionality
of a North Carolina requirement that a voter be able to read and write
any section of the constitution of North Carolina as a prerequisite to
registration, the Court said:
We do not suggest that any standards which a State desires to
adopt may be required of voters. But there is wide scope for
exercise of its jurisdiction. Residence requirements, age, previous
criminal record . . . are obvious examples indicating factors
which a State may take into consideration in determining the
qualifications of voters. 7
Quoting both Lassiter and Pope, the Supreme Court, in
Carrington v. Rash," used a "reasonableness" test to declare
unconstitutional a Texas constitutional provision concerning the
eligibility of members of the armed forces to vote in Texas.9 The
provision in question prohibited any member of the United States
armed forces who moved his home to Texas during his military service
from ever voting in any election so long as he was a member of the
armed forces.' 0 The Court recognized that the state had "treated all
members of the military with an equal hand," but stated that this did
not end the judicial inquiry and that the courts had to "reach and
determine the question whether the classifications drawn in a statute
are reasonable in light of its purpose .... ."" Justice Harlan,
dissenting, declared that this was the first case to subject state laws
governing voter qualifications to the limitations of the equal protection
clause. 12
The "reasonableness" test used by the Supreme Court in
Carrington was also used in Drueding v. Devlin. 3 Under consideration
5. Id. at 633.
6. 360 U.S.45 (1959).
7. Id. at 51.
8. 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
9. Id. at 91, 93.
10. Id. at 89.
11. Id. at 93.
12. Id. at 97.
13. 234 F. Supp. 720 (1964), affd per curiam, 380 U.S. 125 (1965). The Voting
1971]
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in this case were provisions of the Maryland Constitution and several
state statutes which imposed a one year residency requirement for
voting in elections for President and Vice-President of the United
States. In upholding the one year residency requirement, the Drueding
court stated that
[t]he several states may impose age, residence and other
requirements, so long as such requirements do not discriminate
against any class of citizens by reason of race, color or other
invidious ground and are not so unreasonable as to violate the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."
While the judges of the Drueding court felt that a shorter residency
requirement could obtain the same objectives, 5 they recognized that
they could not "substitute [their] personal views for those of the
Legislature and people of Maryland, unless there [had] been an
unreasonable discrimination." 6
In 1969, the Supreme Court, in Kramer v. Union Free School
District No. 15,1 was again faced with deciding the constitutionality of
a state statute limiting the franchise. The New York statute involved in
this case limited the franchise in certain school district elections to the
owners or lessees of taxable real estate and to parents or guardians of
children in public schools who were otherwise eligible to vote in state
and federal elections." In holding that this statute violated the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, the Supreme Court
applied a different test from the "reasonableness" test used in
Carrington and Drueding. From the rationale of Reynolds v. Sims,'
the Court recognized the need to give the statute in question a close and
exacting examination and stated that:
[S]ince the right to exercise the franchise in a free and unimpaired
manner is preservative of other basic pivil and political rights, any
Rights Amendments of 1970, PUB. L. No. 91-285, amending Voting Rights Act of 1965,
42 U.S.C. § 1973 et. seq., overruled the holding in Drueding by abolishing state
durational residency requirements for Presidential and Vice-Presidential elections.
14. 234 F. Supp. at 723 (footnote omitted).
15. The court recognized these objectives as being "(I) 'identifying the voter, and as
a protection against fraud;' and (2) to insure that the votei will 'become in fact a member
of the community, and as such have a common interest in all matters pertaining to its
government."' 234 F. Supp. at 724.
16. Id. at 724 (emphasis added).
17. 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
18. Id. at 622.
19. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
[Vol. 23
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alleged infringement of the right of citizens to vote must be
carefully and meticulously scrutinized. 2m
The Court went on to set out the test to be used in this careful and
meticulous scrutinization:
If a challenged state statute grants the right to vote to some bona
fide residents or requisite age and citizenship and denies the
franchise to others, the Court must determine whether the
exclusions are necessary to promote a compelling state interest
. . Accordingly, when we are reviewing statutes which deny
some residents the right to vote, the general presumption of
constitutionality afforded state statutes and the traditional
approval given state classifications if the Court can conceive of a
"rational basis" for the distinctions made are not applicable.2 '
In Cipriano v. City of Houma,22 the Supreme Court reiterated the
"compelling interest" test used in Kramer,2 3 and declared
unconstitutional a Louisiana law which restricted the franchise to
"property taxpayers" in elections to approve the issuance of revenue
bonds by a municipal utility. The Court held that the law violated the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
24
In 1969, the constitutionality of a residency requirement was again
brought before the Supreme Court in the case of Hall v. Beals.2 This
case involved a six month Colorado residency requirement which a
three-judge district court had held to be constitutional on the basis of
the Drueding decision. The Supreme Court, however, refused to decide
the case on its merits.
26
The Supreme Court on two occasions since Kramer and Cipriano
20. 395 U.S. at 626 quoting from Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964).
21. Id. at 627 (footnote omitted).
22. 395 U.S. 701 (1969).
23. Id. at 703.
24. Id. at 702. The court based its holding on its determination that the statute in
question "excluded otherwise qualified voters who [were] as substantially affected and
directly interested in the matter voted upon as [were] those who [were] permitted to
vote." Id. at 706.
25. 292 F. Supp. 610 (D. Colo. 1968), vacated per curiam, 396 U.S. 45 (1969).
26. Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45 (1969). The Supreme Court refused to render a
decision on the merits, stating (1) that the case was moot due to the fact that the election
was over and the statute in question had been amended, and 2) that the appellants did not
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has invalidated state statutes restricting the franchise in one way or
another.27 In City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski,28 the Court declared
unconstitutional a restriction on the franchise which only allowed real
property owners to vote in elections to approve the issuance of general
obligation bonds. The decision in this case was based on the principles
upon which Kramer and Cipriano were decided. 21 In Evans v.
Cornman,30 the Supreme Court, quoting from the pre-Kramer cases of
Carrington v. Rash3' and Lassiter v. Northampton Election Board,3
held that the Maryland statute, which denied the franchise to people
living on the grounds of a federal inclave in Maryland, was
unconstitutional .3  The Court assumed, without deciding, that the
interest or purpose asserted as a justification for the limitation on the
vote was "sufficiently compelling to justify limitations on the
suffrage,"1 but decided that the limitation did not fulfill its asserted
purpose.
II. COMPELLING STATE INTEREST TEST V. REASONABLENESS TEST
The line of Supreme Court cases dealing with restrictions on the
franchise have not made clear the equal protection test to be used in
determining the constitutionality of durational residency requirements
for voting in elections other than Presidential and Vice-Presidential
elections. Of several cases3 which have handled this question since
Kramer, the majority have decided that one year residency
requirements are unconstitutional 30 but one has held them to be
constitutional.
37
27. City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 90 S. Ct. 1990 (1970); Evans v. Cornman, 90 S.
Ct. 1752 (1970).
28. 90 S. Ct. 1990 (1970).
29. City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 90 S. Ct. 1990, 1993-94 (1970).
30. 90 S. Ct. 1752 (1970).
31. 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
32. 360 U.S. 45 (1959).
33. 90 S. Ct. at 1754-55.
34. Id.
35. See cases cited note 2 supra.
36. Burg v. Canniffe, 315 F. Supp. 380 (D. Mass. 1970); Blumstein v. Ellington
(M.D. Tenn. 1970)peiltion for cert.filed, 39 U.S.L.W. 3229 (U.S. Sept. 29, 1970) (No.
769), prob. jurisdiction noted. 39 U.S.L.W. 3375 (U.S. Mar. 1, 1971) (No. 769); Keane
v. Mihaly, 11 Cal. App. 3d 1037, 90 Cal. Rptr. 263 (Ct. App. 1970); Kohn v. Davis, 39
U.S.L.W. 2253 (D. Vt. 1970); Bufford v. Holton, 319 F. Supp. 843 (E.D. Va. 1970).
37. Cocanower v. Marston, 318 F. Supp. 402 (1970).
[Vol. 23
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In Burg v. Canniffe,3s the plaintiff challenged the constitutionality
of Massachusetts' constitutional and statutory provisions which
imposed a one year residency requirement for voting.39 He alleged that
the provisions denied him his rights under the equal protection and due
process clauses of the fourteenth amendment, and alternatively, that
they violated the right of interstate travel and restrained interstate
commerce. The court determined that the plaintiff met the statutory
residency requirement, and that the issue for decision was whether the
applicable provision of the Massachusetts Constitution violated the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 0
The Burg court realized that in order to determine whether the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment had been violated,
it had to decide what equal protection "test" should be used. Rejecting
the defendant's contention that the "rational legislative purpose" test
should be applied, the court determined that the "compelling state
interest" test had to be used. In making this determination, the court
seemed to agree with the plaintiff's contention that Drueding v. Devlin4
is "no longer a viable decision of the Supreme Court" in light of
subsequent Supreme Court cases which have applied the "compelling
38. 315 F. Supp. 380 (D. Mass. 1970).
39. MASS. CONST., amend., art. III provides:
Every citizen of twenty-one years of age and upwards, excepting
paupers and persons under guardianship and persons temporarily or
permanently disqualified by law because of corrupt practices in respect to
elections who shall have resided within the commonwealth one year, and
within the town or district in which he may claim a right to vote, six
calendar months next preceding any election of governor, lieutenant
governor, senators, or representatives, shall have a right to vote in such
election of governor, lieutenant governor, senators and representatives; and
no other person shall be entitled to vote in such elections.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 51, § I provides in part:
. . . every citizen twenty-one years of age or older .. who can read
the constitution of the commonwealth in English and write his name, and
who has resided in the commonwealth one year and in the city or town
where he claims the right to vote six months last preceding a state, city or
town election, and who has complied with the requirements of this chapter,
may have his name entered on the list of voters in such city or town, and
may vote therein in any such election. . . . No other person shall have his
name entered upon the list of voters or have the right to vote;. . ..
40. 315 F. Supp. at 382.
41. 234 F. Supp. 721 (1964), affd per curiam, 380 U.S. 125 (1965). This case
applied the test of whether or not the statutes were "so unreasonable that they amount to
an irrational or unreasonable discrimination." 234 F. Supp. at 725.
42. 315 F. Supp. at 384.
19711
6
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 2 [1971], Art. 7
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol23/iss2/7
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
state interest" test.43 After quoting from Kramer and Cipriano, the
Burg court pointed out that in Shapiro v. Thompson44 the Supreme
Court
specifically rejected ...the rationale of three of its former
decisions . . . each of which had used the rational legislative basis
test, and embraced as the appropriate test the following: "[A]ny
classification which serves to penalize the exercise of that right
[interstate movement], unless shown to be necessary to promote a
compelling governmental interest, is unconstitutional."''
The Burg court went on to state that any lingering doubts that the
"compelling state interest" test must be used in determining the
constitutionality of state voting statutes "would appear to be
permanently put to rest" 6 by Evans v. Cornman4" and City of Phoenix
v. Kolodziejski.14
Having determined that the "compelling state interest" test had to
be used, the Burg court declared unconstitutional the one year
residency requirement because there was no showing that it served to
promote a compelling state interest. 49 The court recognized that states
have a legitimate interest in requiring voters to "establish that they
have satisfied a durational residence requirement of some length,""0 but
specifically stated that it intimated "no opinion as to whether any other
durational residence requirement short of twelve months may be found
to serve a compelling state interest." 51
In Keane v. Mihaly,"2 the California Court of Appeals faced the
issue of the constitutionality of a one year residency requirement
43. Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Cipriano v. City of
Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
44. 394 U.S. 618 (1969). This case held that state and District of Columbia
statutory provisions imposing a one year residency requirement for eligibility to receive
welfare assistance were unconstitutional.
45. 315 F. Supp. at 384, quoting from Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634
(1969).
46. 315 F. Supp. at 385.
47. 398 U.S.419 (1970).
48. 399 U.S. 204 (1970).
49. 315 F. Supp. at 385. The opinion of the court did not invalidate any provision
other than the one year requirement. See Maryland constitutional provision cited in note
36 supra.
50. 315 F. Supp. at 385.
51. Id. at 386.
52. 11 Cal. App. 3d 1037,90 Cal. Rptr. 263 (Ct. App. 1970).
[Vol. 23
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similar to the one involved in Burg. After deciding that the'petition was
not moot even though the deadline for registration had passed,O the
Keane court went on, using reasoning similar to that found in Burg, to
determine that the "compelling state interest" test was the proper
standard of equal protection to be applied. The court explicitly stated
that they would have followed the Pope and Drueding cases "had not
the United States Supreme Court in later cases established a new
standard, and the Supreme Court of this state [California] clearly
recognized and announced the change. .. ."
While the Keane court stated that the older standard of
reasonableness "still obtains in many matters of less fundamental
importance,"" it rejected the argument that the new "compelling state
interest" standard "applies only when the classification is of the
'suspect' kind, a motive for unfair discrimination being discernible." 56
The court based its rejection of this argument on the Burg case,
Blumstein v. Ellington,57 and two California Supreme Court cases."
Having determined that the "compelling state interest" test
should be used, the Keane court went on to apply this test to the factual
situation at hand. Two general reasons were presented to the court for
upholding the residency rule: 1) the need for having an informed
electorate, and 2) the need for preventing fraudulent or false
declarations of residency.55 The court decided that neither or these
constituted a compelling state interest.
Observing that the California one-year residency requirement was
created in 1879, the Keane court pointed out the many changes which
have taken place since that date, especially in the areas of
communication and education. It also noted that information on some
important issues is not available until "'a time much less removed than
one year from the election,"6" and that the voters usually only learn
53. 90 Cal. Rptr. at 264.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 265.
56. Id. at 266.
57. (M.D. Tenn. 1970) petition for cert. filed, 39 U.S.L.W. 3229 (U.S. Sept. 29,
1970) (No. 769); prob. jurisdiction noted, 39 U.S.L.W. (Mar. 1, 1971) (No. 769).
58. Castro v. State, 2 Cal. 3d 223,466 P.2d 244, 85 Cal. Rptr. 20 (1970); Sei Fujii v.
State, 38 Cal. 2d 718, 242 P.2d 617 (1952).
59. 90 Cal. Rptr. at 266.
60. Id. at 267.
1971]
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who the candidates are after primary elections. The court summarized
its feelings on the question of voters' information when it said:
Probably a certain amount of sensitivity to the problems of the
state is gained as residence becomes longer, but to say that in order
to cast an informed vote it is necessary to have the whole year
which was selected in 1879 is another matter."
With regard to the proposition that the residency requirement was
needed to prevent fraudulent or false declarations of residency, the
Keane court considered both the problem of "false declarations
knowingly made" and the problem of "false, though not necessarily
fraudulent, declarations," and determined that neither or these
problems necessitated the one year requirement."
The same issue which faced the Burg and Keane courts faced a
three-judge District Court in Cocanower v. Marston," which involved
Arizona's one-year residency requirement."' In Cocanower, however,
the issue was resolved in a different manner. The court stated:
[T]here is authority to indicate that the compelling state interest
test is not the applicable standard and that the Equal Protection
Clause does not yet demand abolition of such state residency
requirements.6 5
While the Cocanower court recognized that the Supreme Court had
applied the "compelling state interest" test in three special purpose
election cases, 6 it went on to point out that
in each case state legislation had the effect of completely denying
the franchise to one or more classes of interested citizens on
grounds other than age and residence. 1
61. Id.
62. Id. at 267-68. The court based its determination, with regard to the "false
declarations knowingly made," on their conclusion that the registrars did not have a need
for, or in practice accomplish, a checking of the voters' declarations. It based its
determination, with regard to the "false, though not necessarily fraudulent,
declarations," on the fact that a "close constitutional scrutiny" had to be given, and that
with the one year requirement there would be a danger of unconstitutionally fencing out
from the franchise a section of the population because of the way they might vote.
63. 318 F. Supp. 402 (D. Ariz. 1970).
64. ARIZ. CONST. art. 7 § 2 (Supp. 1969-70); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-101
(1956).
65. Cocanower v. Marston, 318 F. Supp. 404 (D. Ariz. 1970).
66. Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Cipriano v. City of
Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969); City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970).
67. 318 F. Supp. at 404.
(Vol. 23
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The Cocanower court placed great weight on the limits of the
holding in Kramer and pointed out that the Court in that case stated
that "[a]ppellant agrees that the States have the power to impose
reasonable citizenship, age, and residency requirements on the
availability of the ballot."68 The court in Cocanower went on to say:
[W]hether the rule be phrased to the effect that the compelling
state interest test has been thus far applied only to cases of
permanent exclusion and limited special purpose elections, or that
residence requirements for state general elections need only be
based on a constitutionally permissive and reasonable state
purpose, the result is the same-the states may still impose
durational residency requirements for voting in their general
elections.6"
After determining that there was no need to apply the "compelling
state interest" test, the Cocanower court declared that the reasoning of
Drueding v. Devlin70 and Hall v. Beals7' appears to remain valid
"insofar as state requirements for state elections are concerned. 7 The
court felt that the extent to which the Voting Rights Amendments of
197073 had nullified the rationale of Drueding and Beals was not clear,
and therefore stated that in the absence of a clearer indication from
Congress or the Supreme Court, they could find no equal protection
violation in Arizona's residency requirement.
74
The Cocanower court also rejected the claim that Arizona's one
year residency requirement violated the constitutional right of freedom
to travel. It based this rejection on a distinction which it claimed the
Supreme Court made in Shapiro v. Thompson71 between "state-
imposed residency requirements as a condition to receiving welfare
benefits and those durational residency requirements imposed as a
qualification to vote."
76
68. 318 F. Supp. at 404 quoting from Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395
U.S. 621, 625-26 (1969).
69. 318 F. Supp. at 405.
70. 234 F. Supp. at 721 (D. Md. 1964). This case, as duscussed in Part I supra,
upheld a state-imposed residency requirement in Presidential elections.
71. 292 F. Supp. 610 (D. Colo. 1968), vacatedper curiam, 396 U.S. 45 (1969).
72. 318 F. Supp. at 407.
73. Pun. L. No. 91-285, amending Voting Rights Act of 1965,42 U.S.C. § 1973 et.
seq.
74. 318 F. Supp. at407.
75. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
76. 318 F. Supp. at 408 (footnote omitted). The Cocanower court found this
distinction in the following words from the Supreme Court's opinion in Shapiro:
Ve imply no view of the validity of waiting-period or residence
1971]
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III. CONCLUSION
While it obviously is not definite at this time which equal
protection test should be used, it is significant that the "compelling
state interest" test has been more widely accepted in recent decisions
and it seems to be the more logical and desirable of the two standards.',
The distinction made by the Cocanower court between cases involving
permanent exclusion and those involving temporary exclusion does not
seem to be a valid one when it is considered that Shapiro invalidated a
temporary rather than a permanent denial of welfare payments. It
would appear neither desirable nor logical to prohibit a state from
imposing a one year residency requirement as a prerequisite for the
receipt of welfare payments,78 and at the same time allow the state to
impose a one year residency requirement for voting." The argument
may also be made that the language of Shapiro implies that the
"compelling state interest" test is the one to be used when considering
voter residency requirements:
We imply no view of the validity of waiting-periods or residence
requirements dtermining eligibility to vote . . Such
requirements may promote compelling state interests on the one
hand, or, on the other, may not be penalties upon the exercise of
the constitutional right of interstate travel.w0
The reasoning of the Keane court seems extremely sound on the
issue of whether there is a compelling state interest in imposing the one
year residency requirement. The advanced communications systems
available and the amount of publicity involved in election campaigns
appears to negate the relevancy of the one year requirement with regard
to the goal of an informed electorate. Apparently, the one year
requirements determining eligibility to vote . . . Such requirements may
promote compelling state interests on the one hand, or, on the other, may
not be penalties upon the exercise of the constitutional right of interstate
travel.
394 U.S. at 638 n.21. The Cocanower court recognized that this note arguably
"implicitly recognizes the compelling state interest test as applicable in determining the
constitutionality of state voting residency requirements. ... 318 F. Supp. at 408.
Further discussion of the constitutional right of freedom to travel is beyond the scope of
this comment.
77. The other standard being the "reasonableness" or "rational legislative
purpose" standard.
78. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
79. In a democratic society it seems proper for the right of suffrage to be more
inalienable than the right to receive welfare payments.
80. 394 U.S. at 638 n. 21.
[Vol. 23
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requirement is not of great value in preventing fraudulent registration,"'
and whatever value it may have in this area seems overshadowed by the
fact that an estimated five million persons were prevented from voting
in 1968 because of state residency rules.
8 2
Due to the fact that thirty-three states, including South Carolina,8
have one year durational residency requirements for voting,u and the
fact that the district courts have gone different ways on what equal
protection standard should be applied to these requirements, the issue
of their constitutionality needs to be resolved by the United States
Supreme Court.'
HERBERT THOMAS MCINTOSH, JR.
81. Keane v. Mihaly, 11 Cal. App. 3d 1037, 90 Cal. Rptr. 263, 267-68 (Cal. App.
1970).
82. The State, March 2, 1971, at 3-A, col. 1.
83. S. C. CODE ANN. § 23-62 (Supp. 1970).
84. The State, March 2, 1971, at 3-A, col. 1.
85. On March 1, 1971, the United States Supreme Court announced that it would
decide the constitutionality of these residency requirements during its next term. The
State, March 2, 1971, at 3-A, col. 1.
19711
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